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Abstract
The paper analyzes econometric models of altruistic giving in dictator and public
goods games. Using existing data sets, I evaluate internal and external validity of
“atheoretic” regression models as well as structural models of random behavior,
random coefficients, and random utility, controlling for subject heterogeneity by
finite mixture modeling. In dictator games, atheoretic regression lacks external
validity, while random coefficient models and random utility models offer high
degrees of both internal and external validity. In public goods games, regression
works comparably well, being bettered only by random utility models. Overall,
the ordered GEV model of random utility is most appropriate to describe choices
in the considered games.
JEL–Codes: C44, C50, C72, D64
Keywords: structural modeling, altruism, dictator game, public goods, ordered
choice sets
∗I thank Friedel Bolle for his helpful comments and James Andreoni and John Miller for permitting
me to use their data. Address: Europa-Universität Viadrina, Postfach 1786, 15207 Frankfurt(Oder),
Germany, email: breitmoser@euv-frankfurt-o.de, Telephone/Fax: +3355534 2291/2390.
1 Introduction
Numerous studies have investigated how the actions of experimental subjects relate to
game theoretic predictions. It was found that experimental subjects generally deviate
from Nash equilibrium, which raised the questions whether the deviations are sys-
tematic and how they could be explained. Several strands of literature emerged (for a
more complete survey of this research, see Camerer, 2003). One of them investigated
whether deviations from the predictions can be the result of social preferences (e.g.
Rabin, 1993, and Levine, 1998), another one additionally allowed that subjects play
noisy responses in relation to some utility function (e.g. Rosenthal, 1989, and McK-
elvey and Palfrey, 1995), a third strand investigated how choice patterns depended
on circumstances (Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1994; Andreoni, 1995b), and
another one investigated the consistency of individual choices (e.g. Andreoni, 1995a).
It was found that both social preferences and noisy responses seem to explain the ob-
served deviations from equilibrium predictions, in response to which Andreoni and
Miller (2002) and Goeree et al. (2002) conducted experiments to separate these po-
tential explanations. They systematically varied exchange rates in dictator games and
public goods games (respectively) to get a complete overview of individual choice
patterns. The conclusions were that social preferences and noisiness of responses
individually interact.
This, in turn, led researches to estimate structural models of altruistic giving that
contain both social preferences and a source of randomness inducing noisy responses.
Fisman et al. (2007) assumed that subjects deviate stochastically from their individ-
ual best response (random behavior), Cox et al. (2007) assumed that the altruism
coefficient in the individual utility function is fluctuating randomly (random coeffi-
cient), and Cappelen et al. (2007) considered a multinomial logit model of choice
(random utility). This multitude of approaches has an obvious flaw, as Conte and
Moffatt (2009) showed that the estimated motive of giving depends on the model
chosen (they do so by fitting a random behavior model to Cappelen et al.’s data).1
In relation to this literature, the present paper answers two questions: Which of
1Conte and Moffatt also criticize the random utility model chosen by Cappelen et al. for neglecting
the orderedness of the choice set in dictator games.
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the three approaches toward structural modeling of altruistic giving is most valid?
And, do the internal or external validity gained justify or even necessitate the move
from atheoretic regression toward structural modeling? To this end, I revisit the ex-
perimental data of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Goeree et al. (2002), estimate the
models to be discussed, and compare measures of internal validity (BIC in-sample)
and external validity (LL out-of-sample). The main results are that random utility
modeling is in general most valid, random coefficient models may fit well (as they do
in Andreoni and Miller’s dictator games) but they may also fail drastically (in Goeree
et al.’s public goods games), and in general the move toward structural modeling is
justified and may be necessary (the validity increases drastically in dictator games).
The approach that emerges as most valid in our analysis is the ordered GEV model of
random utility (Small, 1987), which has been overlooked by previous game-theoretic
analyses, but poses a direct response to the critique that random utility as in multino-
mial logit ignores orderedness of choice sets (e.g. Conte and Moffatt, 2009).
From a more general point of view, the present paper contributes to the discus-
sion of the comparative advantages of structural modeling and regression—recently
revamped by e.g. Keane (2010) and Rust (2010)—by presenting quantitative evidence
based on experimental data. As indicated, the evidence underlines the general idea
that structural models have higher external validity than (linear) regression, but sur-
prisingly they also have higher internal validity. That is, structural models (and in
particular random utility models) are better in describing the basic characteristics of
individual choice in the considered games, and hence they are preferable even if only
internal validity is of interest.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the dictator game
data of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and discusses tobit regression models. Section 3
analyzes the standard structural models discussed in the literature, and Section 4 ex-
tends the analysis to random utility models relaxing the assumption of independence
from irrelevant alternatives (i.e. ordered GEV and nested logit). Section 5 verifies the
robustness of the dictator game results by analyzing the public goods game data of
Goeree et al. (2002). Section 6 concludes. There is extensive supplementary material
that lists (amongst others) all parameter estimates.
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2 The data and initial analysis
In a dictator game, only player 1 has to choose a strategy. His choice affects the payoff
of 2, however, and this payoff interdependence seems utility relevant for laboratory
subjects. Let 1’s strategy set be denoted as S1 = {0,1, . . . ,B}, with B as endowment,
and let τ1,τ2 denote (positive) exchange rates. The two players’ payoffs are
pi1(s) = τ1(B− s) pi2(s1) = τ2s ∀s ∈ S1. (1)
We analyze the dictator game experiment conducted by Andreoni and Miller (2002),
who explicitly designed their experiment to evaluate the consistency of dictator de-
cisions with utility maximization. There are eight decisions per subject, based on
systematic variations of (B,τ1,τ2). This allows us to econometrically disentangle
randomization and distributive preferences at the individual level.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the treatment parameters and the data. The
data exhibits typical characteristics of dictator games. For example, the donations are
fairly moderate overall, they are decreasing in τ1, and they are increasing in τ2. The
standard analytical approach to show this is to estimate a (tobit) regression model of
donations on (B,τ1,τ2). In our context, the result is
s1 =−8.172
(8.86)
+0.254
(0.066)
·B−4.348
(1.871)
· τ1+4.878
(1.838)
· τ2+ ε (2)
where ε is normal with standard deviation σˆ = 27.645. Regression analyses of this
kind are common in experimental studies, arguably because they are pure—by avoid-
ing complex specification—which seems to imply that the data speaks for itself. In
our case, the analysis suggests that the aforementioned effects are significant (s1 is
decreasing in τ1 and increasing in τ2), and that the donations fall by 4.3 on average
per unit increase of τ1 and they increase by 4.9 on average per unit increase of τ2.
The validity of such conclusions is questionable, however, as tobit models ignore the
structure of dictator games. Hence, their results are susceptible to what originally
became known as the Lucas critique. This issue is the topic of the following.
Throughout, we distinguish external validity and internal validity. Results have
internal validity if they accurately reflect the observed interaction, and they have ex-
ternal validity if they continue to hold in related circumstances. Arguably, regression
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Figure 1: Treatment parameters and data of Andreoni and Miller (2002)
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models have higher internal validity than structural models, whereas structural mod-
els have higher external validity. The former may result, since regression models are
estimated without restrictive structural assumptions to be obeyed, while the latter fol-
lows precisely from the structural restrictions, which reduce the risk of overfitting and
improve one’s chances of capturing the structure of decision making. This depends,
of course, on how well one’s model structure approximates the problem structure.
In the present context, it seems reasonable not to ignore subject heterogeneity.
For example, Andreoni and Miller’s analysis isolated seven types of subjects (as will
be discussed in more detail below). In order to represent (latent) heterogeneity, we
resort to finite mixture modeling (see e.g. Peel and MacLahlan, 2000).2 That is,
subject heterogeneity is described non-parametrically by distinguishing up to seven
discrete types, rather than parametrically by assuming a continuous distribution of
types. This approach is adopted, as Andreoni and Miller identified seven distinctive
types rather than a continuum of types.
Formally, let K denote the set of subject types in the population, e.g. K = {1,2,3}
in a three-type population, let (µk)k∈K denote the type shares, and for all k ∈ K, let
Pk denote the parameter profile characterizing type k. Now, if o j,t denotes the tth
observation of subject j ∈ J in the data set and if σ(o j,t |Pk) is the probability that i
chooses o j,t conditional on being of type k, the log-likelihood of o = (o j,t) is
LL(o|P) = ∑
j∈J
ln∑
k∈K
µk∏
t
σ(o j,t |Pk). (3)
Using the finite mixture approach, I have estimated models of subject hetero-
geneity where each type is described by the linear (tobit) model defined in Eq. (2).
Table 1 lists the goodness-of-fit of the various models, distinguishing internal and ex-
ternal validity. The measure of internal validity is Bayes’ information criterion (BIC,
see Schwarz, 1978) of the model fitted to the whole data set. The measure of exter-
nal validity is the log-likelihood (LL) of the respective model fit to a subset of the
2In experimental economics, finite mixture models are best known from analyses of strategic rea-
soning, starting with Stahl and Wilson (1995), but have recently been extended to choice under risk
(Conte et al., 2008; Harrison and Rutström, 2009; Bruhin et al., 2010), giving in dictator games (Cap-
pelen et al., 2007, 2010), and donations to public goods (Bardsley and Moffatt, 2007).
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Table 1: Validity of the linear behavioral model Eq. (2) in dictator games
Benchmarks Number of types of the linear behavioral model
Lower Upper One Two Three Four Five Six Seven
Internal 5814 2449 4276 3783 3672 3491 3439 3409 3392
External 1574 643 1198 1091 1149 1252 1171 1215 1277
Note: Internal validity is BIC = −LL+(#Pars)/2 · ln(#Obs) of the model fitted to the whole data
set, external validity is −LL in treatments 6,8 of the model fitted to the restricted sample (1–5,7).
data (treatments 1–5 and 7) and evaluated in the other two treatments (6 and 8).3 In
addition, Table 1 reports two benchmark measures that will be referred to frequently.
These benchmarks are defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Benchmarks). The upper benchmark is the absolute value of the log-
likelihood obtained by a model that predicts the actually observed relative frequencies
of all actions in all treatments. The lower benchmark is the absolute value of the log-
likelihood of predicting uniform randomization in all treatments.
Note that the upper benchmark reported is the strict upper benchmark of models
assuming independence of choices between treatments. If latent subject heterogeneity
as reported by Andreoni and Miller (2002) exists indeed, such independence assump-
tions are invalid and the upper bound is not strict. It is intended as an indication of
what to expect from a “good” model. The following result summarizes Table 1 (the
respective parameter estimates are provided as supplementary material).
Result 2.2. Tobit models lack validity. Finite mixtures of tobit models induce negative
correlation between internal and external validity (ρˆ=−0.36), and in relation to the
benchmarks, the internally best model attains 72.0% internal validity4 and 31.9%
external validity.
Note the particularly low external validity of all estimated tobit models. Dictator
game results derived from tobit (or related linear) regression models do not continue
3The treatments chosen for the out-of-sample tests are intermediate in the sense that the donation
in relation to endowment is intermediate. We thus investigate external validity with respect to related,
non-extreme circumstances.
40.72 = (5814−3392)/(5814−2449)
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to hold even in closely related dictator games. Structural models of behavior may
allow us to avoid this pitfall.
3 Randomness of behavior, coefficients, and utility
Andreoni and Miller distinguished six specific subject types and one residual type.
The six specific types have Cobb-Douglas, Leontief, or linear utility functions and
either high or medium consistency (i.e. accuracy) in maximizing utilities. On the one
hand, the three utility functions are special cases of CES utilities,
ui(pii,pi j) =
(
(1−α) · (1+pii)β+α · (1+pi j)β
)1/β
, (4)
if (pii,pi j) denotes the payoff profile in question and using ui =−(abs(. . .))1/β in case
the base is negative. CES utilities have also been assumed in the existing structural
models discussed soon. The varying degrees of accuracy, on the other hand, will be
represented by varying the scale of noise in models based on these utility functions.
Depending on where the noise is assumed to enter decision making, one may
distinguish three classes of structural models for dictator games: random behavior,
random coefficients, and random utility. In analyses of dictator games, random be-
havior has been studied by Fisman et al. (2007) and Conte and Moffatt (2009), random
coefficients have been studied by Cox et al. (2007), and random utility by Cappelen
et al. (2007). The comparative advantages of these models have not yet been ana-
lyzed, however. In this section we analyze the validity of the models as they have
been discussed by these authors. Alternative models are considered below.
To provide formal definitions, let u(s|α,β) denote i’s utility from donating s∈ S1,
and define BR(α,β) ∈ argmaxs∈S1 u(s|α,β) as the (generically unique) utility maxi-
mizing donation of a subject with parameters (α,β).
Definition 3.1 (Random behavior). The choice of i is a random variable Si =BR(α,β)+
ε, censored at 0 and B, where ε is normal with mean zero and standard deviation σ.
Definition 3.2 (Random coefficient). The choice of i is a random variable Si =BR(α,β),
where α is such that α′ :=α/(1−α) has density f (α′)= ρ exp{(|α−m|/s)ρ}/2sΓ(1/ρ).
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Table 2: Internal and external validity of basic structural models
Number of types
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven
Random be-
havior
4349 3889 3817 3824 3248 3261 3214
1238 1119 1096 1091 1102 1088 1049
Random co-
efficient
4353 3861 3757 2964 2730 2668 2687
1235 1100 1075 904 815 811 813
Random
utility
4724 3917 3253 3238 3030 3021 2973
1316 1112 971 973 937 924 919
Note: As in Table 1, the top row (per model) contains the BIC = −LL+ (#Pars)/2 · ln(#Obs)
measure of internal validity and the bottom row contains the −LL measure of external validity.
The assumption that α′ := α/(1−α) has exponential power distribution with
mean m, scale s, shape ρ (i.i.d. for each decision) follows Cox et al. (2007). The
implied probability that i chooses an action s′i ≤ si is F(α∗) where F is the cdf and α∗
is chosen such that ui(si|α∗) = ui(si + 1|α∗). See Cox et al. (2007, Appendix B) for
further illustrations on the computational procedure.
Definition 3.3 (Random utility). Player i maximizes the utility u˜ = λu(s|α,β) + ε
where λ≥ 0 and ε has extreme value distribution (i.i.d. for all options s ∈ S1).
The assumption that ε be extreme value distributed implies the multinomial logit
choice probabilities.
∀s ∈ S1 : Pr(s) = eλu(s|α,β)/ ∑
s′∈S1
eλu(s
′|α,β). (5)
Table 2 summarizes internal and external validity for these three classes of mod-
els. The full list of parameter estimates is provided as supplementary material. Before
the results are summarized, let me briefly comment on the optimization procedure.
The main issues to be resolved are the non-concavity of the likelihood function in fi-
nite mixture models, which follows from the interchangeability of types, and the high
degree of non-linearity of the log-likelihood in many structural models. I adopted a
variety of maximization methods, including Nelder-Mead and gradient based ones,
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and many different starting values to ensure global convergence. Furthermore, nu-
merical accuracy tends to be an issue in the summation underlying Eq. (5), as the
numbers to be summed up can become large. This issue had been resolved by ap-
propriately adapting the internal representation of numbers (further details are avail-
able upon request). Finally, the well-known issues with two-step estimators (see e.g.
Amemiya, 1978, and Arcidiacono and Jones, 2003) were avoided by maximizing the
full-information likelihood jointly over all parameters.
Result 3.4. All three structural models induce positive correlation between inter-
nal and external validity, and overall the most valid model is the random coefficient
model. In relation to the benchmarks (Def. 2.1), it attains (up to) 93.5% internal
validity and 82.0% external validity.
Recall that the random coefficient model is based on four parameters per subject
type, whereas the other two (structural) models are based on three parameters per
type. Hence, the improved goodness-of-fit measures of the random coefficient models
may be due to their higher flexibility in fitting behavioral patterns. To address this
possibility, we will next investigate slightly more flexible random utility models.
4 Generalized random utility models
Random utility models as they are applied in experimental analyses generally assume
i.i.d. random components ε (as in Def. 3.3). This induces independence from irrel-
evant alternatives (IIA) in the choice probabilities, and as such it is an implication
that is not generally realistic. The established choice theoretic approaches toward
modeling deviations from IIA assume that subjects group choices with similar char-
acteristics and that they first pick a group (“nest”) and second pick a choice from that
nest. Depending on whether the assumed nests overlap, we distinguish nested logit
models and cross-nested logit models, which both are special cases of the case that the
random components ε in Def. 3.3 have generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution
(McFadden, 1978).
For some reason, GEV models of (strategic) choice have not yet been adopted
in experimental economics. To my knowledge, all random utility analyses of exper-
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imental data that followed McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Anderson et al. (1998)
assume multinomial strategy sets. One reason may be that GEV models are compu-
tationally more intensive that multinomial logit (see e.g. Small, 1994), and a second
reason may be that the additional flexibility attained in GEV models is feared to fa-
cilitate overfitting. The latter loosely relates to the result of Haile et al. (2008) who
showed that random utility models may fit any data set if the distributional assump-
tions on ε are sufficiently weak. To be sure, the assumptions in standard GEV models
are far more restrictive than the technical requirements of Haile et al., but empirical
analyses similar to the one reported next seem necessary to convince practitioners.
The main issue in defining suitable GEV models is to identify characteristics
based on which subjects group choices. Small (1987) argues that subjects nest choices
based on proximity under the ordering of the choice set (if such an ordering exists)
and defines the ordered GEV model to capture this possibility. Ordered GEV is a spe-
cial case of cross-nested logit (see e.g. Vovsha, 1997) and of “elimination by aspect”
(Tversky, 1972, see also McFadden, 1981, p. 225f). Alternatively, we also consider
two disjointly nested models. The first one is a “control model” to verify whether
seemingly arbitrary nesting based on numeral digits induces a good fit. Here, two
choice options belong to the same nest if their first digits coincide.
s and s′ are in the same nest ⇔ bs/10c= bs′/10c (numeral nested)
with bxc as the largest integer not greater than x. That is, “numeral nested” assumes
that subjects pick the first digit (of the number of tokens to donate) first and the
second digit last. The other nested logit model is based on the ratio of payoffs pii and
pi j between dictator and recipient, respectively. Andreoni and Miller (2002) found
that this ratio would be of significant relevance for a fair share of the subjects.
s and s′ are in the same nest ⇔ bpii(s)/pi j(s)c= bpii(s′)/pi j(s′)c
(ratio nested)
The formal specification of nested logit models is standard, see e.g. McFadden (1984).
Definition 4.1 (Nested logit). If (Br)r∈R denotes a partition of S1 into nests, then the
probability of choosing s ∈ Br ⊂ B is
σ(s) =
exp
{
λu(s|α,β)/ρ}
exp{Ir} ·
exp{ρIr}
∑t∈R exp{ρIt}
(6)
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with inclusive values Ir = ln∑s′∈Br exp
{
λu(s′|α,β)/ρ} for all r ∈ R.
In relation to nested logit, the nests Br in ordered GEV models are overlapping,
but aside from this, the definition is fairly similar.
Definition 4.2 (Ordered GEV). Using bandwidth M ∈ N0, ρ ∈ [0,1], and weights
wm ≥ 0 for all m = 0, . . . ,M such that ∑Mm=0 wm = 1, the choice probabilities are
σ(s) =
s+M
∑
r=s
wr−s exp
{
λu(s|α,β)/ρ}
exp{Ir} ·
exp{ρIr}
∑B+Mt=0 exp{ρIt}
(7)
with inclusive value Ir = ln∑s′∈Br wr−s′ exp
{
λu(s′|α,β)/ρ} for all r ∈ {0, . . . ,B+M}
and nests Br =
{
s ∈ {0,1, . . . ,B} | r−M ≤ s≤ r}.
Intuitively, player i first picks a neighborhood Br, r ∈ {0, . . . ,B+M}, and sec-
ond picks a strategy s ∈ Br in this neighborhood. Every strategy belongs to M + 1
neighborhoods. The probability of choosing s conditional on having chosen Br is the
first factor above, and the probability of choosing nest Br is the second factor above.
These probabilities are aggregated over all neighborhoods containing s.
Small (1987, Prop. 1) shows that ordered GEV is a GEV model indeed, which
implies that it is consistent with random utility maximization and a special case of the
quantal response framework defined by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In addition,
ordered GEV reduces to multinomial logit if ρ= 1 or M = 0, and Small (1987, Prop.
2) shows that the random utility components εs and εs′ are stochastically independent
if | j− k| > M. We use the bandwidth M = B/2 rounded up to the nearest even (but
any M that is sufficiently large would do similarly), and Gaussian weights
wm = fN (M/2,σ2)(m)/
M
∑
m=0
fN (M/2,σ2)(m), (8)
where fN (µ,σ2) denotes the density of the normal distribution with mean M/2 and
variance σ2 (the latter is estimated from the data). Finally, to improve comparability
with the other models, which require four parameters per type, we assume that ρ is
constant across types.
The whole set of parameter estimates can be found in the supplementary material
again. Table 3 summarizes their respective measures of validity. The observations can
be summarized as follows.
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Table 3: Internal and external validity of the GEV models
Number of types
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven
Numeral
nested logit
3932 3877 3028 2923 2854 2833 2800
1337 1097 1207 1236 1192 1191 938
Ratio
nested logit
4294 3801 3206 3031 3106 2957 2927
1156 1083 950 899 966 942 916
Ordered
GEV
4300 3087 3034 2857 2805 2708 2655
1195 843 891 872 858 818 807
Note: As in Table 1, the top row (per model) contains the BIC = −LL+ (#Pars)/2 · ln(#Obs)
measure of internal validity and the bottom row contains the −LL measure of external validity.
Result 4.3. The best random utility model relaxing IIA is ordered GEV. Its validity
overall is similar to that of random coefficient modeling, and it is better for small
numbers of types. The “control model” numeral nested logit has fairly high internal
validity but lacks external validity (as anticipated).
5 Analysis of public goods contributions
To verify the robustness of the above results, we repeat the procedure in an analysis
of contributions to linear public goods. The net transfers induced by contributions
to public goods are comparable to donations in dictator games, and if players have
linear utilities, these games are essentially equivalent in that both games induce best
responses that are independent of the opponents’ choices. A difference between dic-
tator games and public goods games persists even in this case, however. In relation
to dictator games, public goods games have it that small increases of altruism tend
to induce comparably large increases of contributions. The reason is that in typical
public goods games, there are several recipients of one’s contribution and the implicit
exchange rates tend to be more favorable.
An experiment analyzing the relevance of exchange rates and the consistency of
decisions in this context has been reported by Goeree et al. (2002). In particular, their
13
experimental treatments vary the group size n as well as external returns τE and in-
ternal returns τI of individual contributions, while the costs τK = .05 of contributions
were held constant. Using N to denote the set of players and Si = {0, . . . ,25} as the
strategy set for all i ∈ N, the payoff function of i in their experiment was
pii(s) = τK · (25− si)+ τIsi+ τE∑
j 6=i
s j. (9)
Figure 2 provides an overview of the treatment parameters and the results of
the experimental results. Goeree et al. (2002) estimated multinomial logit models of
random utility, using linear and Cobb-Douglas functions utility functions. We will
consider more general n-player CES aggregators similar to above.5
ui =
(
(1−α)piβi + α|N|−1 ∑ j 6=ipi
β
j
)1/β
(10)
Random utility modeling (i.e. multinomial logit) was also applied by Anderson et al.
(1998) to standard public goods games, by Offerman et al. (1998), Myatt and Wallace
(2008), and Choi et al. (2008) to threshold public goods games, and by Willinger and
Ziegelmeyer (2001) and Yi (2003) to nonlinear games. A model of random behavior
was estimated by Bardsley and Moffatt (2007). Only the latter control for subject
heterogeneity through finite mixture modeling. An analysis of the validity of these
alternative approaches has not been reported yet, and to my knowledge, random co-
efficient models or GEV models have not been considered at all. Recall that these
neglected models proved most valid in our analysis of dictator games.
Our analysis of public goods games mimics the above analysis of dictator games
in virtually all aspects. The only notable difference is that we need to consider mu-
tual (quantal) responses following for example McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Using
the computational simplification described by Goeree et al. (2002, Footnotes 20,21),
equilibria can be computed straightforwardly.6 This applies equally to equilibria in
5The CES utility is appropriate also in the case of public goods, as it contains “conditional co-
operators” (Leontief preferences) and “free riders” (egoists) as special cases. These types have been
identified repeatedly in the literature (Keser and van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001).
6That is, we assume that players choose best/quantal responses to the expected contributions of the
opponents, and in equilibrium, they have rational expectations.
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Figure 2: Treatment parameters and data of Goeree et al. (2002)
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responses based on random behavior and random coefficients. As for the linear (to-
bit) baseline model, the independent variables are the treatment parameters again, i.e.
group size, external return, and internal return.
Table 4 summarizes the measures of validity, and the supplementary material
contains the whole set of parameter estimates. The main results are somewhat sur-
prising and can be summarized as follows.
Result 5.1. Only random utility models improve upon tobit regression in terms of
internal validity, and only ordered GEV does so also in terms of external validity.
The random coefficient model performs worst, as it does not even meet the lower
benchmark.
The fact that ordered GEV performs best confirms our observations from the
dictator game. It scores about 50% internal as well as external validity in relation to
the benchmarks, which is less than it did in the dictator game. This is a consequence
of the comparably small sample size in the experiment of Goeree et al. (2002), which
makes the upper benchmark particular tough to reach. Aside from this, the most
interesting observation seems to be the dismal performance of the random coefficient
model. It implies that the random coefficient model is not generally valid, and that its
validity in dictator games may be coincidental. The underlying issue can be explained
as follows. In the dictator game experiment the donation efficiencies ranged from
1/3 to 3 (i.e. up to $3 transfer resulted from a donation of $1). In the public goods
experiment, the donation efficiencies ranged from 1 to 18, i.e. donations were more
efficient overall and much more efficient at the upper bound. When donations are
that efficient, then small increases in α imply comparably large increases in the utility
maximizing donation. In turn, the optimal donation is fairly sensitive with respect
to α in the public goods experiment, and in this sense it poses a tougher test for
constance of the altruism parameter α than the dictator game experiment.
To illustrate this, I computed the α′ = α/(1−α) (see Def. 3.2) that explain the
mean observation in all treatments (using the estimated β). One might expect these
α′ to be fairly constant. In the dictator game experiment, the ratio of the highest α′ to
the lowest α′ in all treatments is 3.08, and in the public goods experiment it is 9.05.7
7The respective α′ = α/(1−α) are (3.141,1.019,2.711,1.245,2.802,1.309,1.911,2.144) for the
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Table 4: Internal and external validity of the models in public good games
(a) The linear behavioral model Eq. (2)
Benchmarks Number of types
Lower Upper One Two Three Four
Internal 1043 787 1002 915 921 935
External 313 234 304 280 283 283
Note: Internal validity is BIC = −LL+ (#Pars)/2 · ln(#Obs) of the
model fitted to the whole data set, external validity is−LL in treatments
8-10 of the model fitted to the restricted sample (1–7).
(b) The basic structural models
Number of types
One Two Three Four
Random be-
havior
1123 988 999 1000
350 327 323 313
Random co-
efficient
1179 1181 1115 1129
480 480 393 393
Random
utility
1018 936 939 915
311 294 296 288
(c) The GEV models
Number of types
One Two Three Four
Numeral
nested logit
1020 957 917 922
310 293 287 285
Ratio
nested logit
1006 957 916 922
308 293 287 288
Ordered
GEV
1008 932 931 908
306 288 285 275
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Thus, to explain the public goods data, highly variable α are required in random
coefficient models, and in turn the actual structure cannot be described in terms of α.
As we can see in Table 4, random behavior and in particular random utility models
are much more suitable to capture the structure of behavior in public goods games,
and thus also overall.
6 Conclusion
The paper compared the validity of econometric models to explain observations from
two of the most widely researched experimental games. Our analysis utilized data
sets from experiments designed to understand structure and consistency of individual
decisions in dictator games (Andreoni and Miller, 2002) and public goods games (Go-
eree et al., 2002). The analysis covered atheoretic regression and various structural
models, including the largely overlooked ordered GEV model (Small, 1987) and a
“control model” relaxing IIA based on seemingly arbitrary nesting (based on numeral
digits).
It was found that random utility modeling tends to be more robust than random
coefficient and random behavior modeling, and of the random utility models consid-
ered, ordered GEV is most appropriate to explain the data, while the “control model”
numeral nested logit indeed has low external validity as expected (in particular in
dictator games). This shows that choosing the appropriate model structure has to be
discussed in more detail than it is done in the current literature, where the various
modeling approaches simply coexist. As for altruistic giving in dictator and public
goods games, ordered GEV seems to be an appropriate model, but to my knowledge,
no such results exist in alternative contexts.
In addition, our analysis confirmed the general suspicion that regression analyses
may lack external validity. Regression analyses misrepresent the underlying patterns
in dictator games and therefore postulate results that do not continue to hold in related
dictator game treatments and (0.475,0.49,0.24,0.161,0.078,0.483,0.163,0.164,0.082,0.054) for the
public goods game treatments. These are the lower bounds for α′ to explain the mean contribution
rounded to the nearest integer.
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dictator games. In this sense we can say that regression analysis does not let the data
speak for itself, but that it squeezes the data into a linear (or non-linear) form that
would fit only coincidentally. To be sure, structural models do not lead to easily di-
gestible conclusions, as their estimates are utility functions and noise parameters, but
that it is exactly the key: easily digestible linear effects are not robust and structurally
wrong. In turn, structurally wrong structural models are not robust either, but as our
results show for dictator and public goods game, such models do usually not have
internal validity to begin with, and random utility models fit robustly in both cases.
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